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Introduction
If one were an inexperienced researcher joining the 
study of dual-process theories of higher cognition (DPTs) 
for the first time, then there might be a few questions that 
might come to mind. What is the fundamental difference 
(or differences) that distinguishes one process of higher 
cognition (e.g., Type 1 reasoning) from the other (e.g., 
Type 2 reasoning)? Is this fundamental difference (or dif-
ferences) preserved in other forms of higher cognition 
such as judgment, decision making, and perhaps even 
problem solving? How can DPTs be falsified?
Evans and Stanovich’s (2013, this issue; hereafter, E&S) 
careful responses and clarification of DPTs in effect give 
direct answers to these research questions. To answer the 
first question, through E&S’s exposition, we as research-
ers into higher order cognition (e.g., inductive, deductive 
causal reasoning, judgment, and decision making) can 
now refer to both necessary and sufficient attributes of 
Type 1 processing [T1] and Type 2 processing [T2]. One 
of the necessary defining features of T1 and T2 process-
ing is the differential loading on working memory (WM): 
There is no loading for T1 and some loading for T2. The 
other necessary defining feature of T1 is that it is autono-
mous (which is not the same as being fast), and another 
defining feature of T2 is that it enables mental simulation. 
Moreover, E&S have now brought some clarity to an 
increasingly detailed and ever changing list of features 
that have been associated with T1 and T2 processing. In 
response to the second question, E&S are clear in that 
they propose that T1 and T2 are found in different forms 
of higher cognition which include reasoning, judgment 
and decision making. Finally, in response to the third 
question, given the necessary and sufficient criteria for 
identifying different processes of higher cognition, it is 
possible to imagine ways of setting up an experimental 
procedure that could attempt to falsify a hypothesis origi-
nating from a DPT position. More to the point, it is clearer 
now what evidence would appear to challenge DPTs.
Given E&S’s illuminating article, the aim of this com-
mentary is to explore Criticism 5: “Evidence for dual pro-
cessing is ambiguous or unconvincing” (p. 232). In order 
to do this, the discussion that follows considers two 
defining characteristics of T1 and T2 processing with 
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Abstract
Dual-process theories of higher order cognition (DPTs) have been enjoying much success, particularly since Kahneman’s 
2002 Nobel prize address and recent book Thinking, Fast and Slow (2009). Historically, DPTs have attempted to 
provide a conceptual framework that helps classify and predict differences in patterns of behavior found under some 
circumstances and not others in a host of reasoning, judgment, and decision-making tasks. As evidence has changed 
and techniques for examining behavior have moved on, so too have DPTs. Killing two birds with one stone, Evans 
and Stanovich (2013, this issue) respond to five main criticisms of DPTs. Along with addressing each criticism in turn, 
they set out to clarify the essential defining characteristics that distinguish one form of higher order cognition from 
the other. The aim of this commentary is to consider the defining characteristics of Type 1 and Type 2 processing that 
have been proposed and to suggest that the evidence can be taken to support quantitative differences rather than 
qualitatively distinct processes.
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respect to findings that E&S themselves cite in support of 
their DPT position: working memory capacity (WMC) 
and automaticity (De Neys, 2006a, 2006b). The commen-
tary begins by showing that evidence judged to support 
qualitatively distinct processes can be reinterpreted as 
evidence for quantitatively different processes and that 
definitions of automaticity require further refinement to 
avoid continued ambiguity (Osman, 2004). The second 
section raises a question about hypothetical thinking in 
causal reasoning and whether it should be classified as 
T2 processing. Finally, the conclusion considers the 
future of DPTs.
Supporting Evidence for DPTs?
Let’s take De Neys’s (2006b) article as our first case study 
for considering the necessary defining distinctions between 
T1 and T2 processing. In the study, all participants were 
first classified into three groups (low, medium and high) 
based on their WMC. WMC was assessed by their perfor-
mance on a WM task; this was a dual-processing task 
based on accurate recall of unrelated words while per-
forming mathematical operations. The main part of the 
experiment involved a manipulation of the syllogisms 
that participants were evaluating. The believability of 
the conclusion of each syllogism was either incongruent 
with the logical conclusion (conflict syllogism) or con-
gruent with the logical conclusion (no-conflict syllogism). 
A second manipulation concerned WM loading (high, 
low, none) while evaluating the syllogisms. The load 
was varied by using a dot memory task, which involved 
the presentation of an array of dots in a 3 × 3 grid with 
each reasoning task sandwiched between a dot task; 
people saw the array before each reasoning task, and 
their job was to replicate the array after evaluating the 
syllogism.
Reinterpreting evidence of qualitative 
differences between T1 and T2 
processes as quantitative differences 
based on the difficulty of the task
Let’s start with a simple prediction that T1 processing is 
found in the no-conflict syllogism, because the syllogisms 
are easy to evaluate correctly and thus there should be 
no effect of WM load. Why might they be easy to evalu-
ate correctly? When logic and belief agree, there is a ten-
dency to accept the syllogism as valid (belief bias effect; 
Wilkins, 1928), and the premises and conclusion are eas-
ily integrated and evaluated because they cohere. This 
can facilitate what seems like a logical response when 
actually people are simply going by how believable the 
conclusion is: believable = valid, and unbelievable = 
invalid. De Neys (2006b) did indeed find support for this 
prediction. Regardless of WMC and WM load, accuracy 
was near to ceiling. So the next most obvious question to 
ask is “Did people use T1 or T2 processing to solve the 
no-conflict tasks?”. Given that there was no loading on 
WM, then presumably responses were generated by T1. 
Why? Because relying on real world knowledge to evalu-
ate a syllogism is likely to be easier (and will not require 
extensive cognitive resources) than implementing the 
rules of logic to assess the syllogism’s validity. That is to 
say that, given the near ceiling performance and lack of 
WM loading, all people responding to no-conflict tasks in 
De Neys’s (2006b) study were more likely to be using a 
T1 process when responding.
What about in the conflict syllogism task? Again, let’s 
adopt a simple prediction that T2 processing is found in 
conflict tasks, because the syllogisms are difficult to eval-
uate and, thus, there should be an effect of WM load. 
Why might they be difficult to evaluate? Because when 
logic and belief disagree, people will tend to base their 
responses on the believability of the conclusion, but they 
have a harder time integrating the premises and conclu-
sion because the result of the integration challenges their 
prior knowledge and experience of relations in the world 
(Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000). De Neys (2006b) also 
found support for this prediction. In fact, he also reported 
similar findings in an earlier study (De Neys & Dieussaert, 
2005). Regardless of the WMC of the participants evaluat-
ing the syllogisms, accuracy of performance was severely 
affected as the load increased. Given that loading on WM 
affected performance regardless of WMC, it appears that 
responses were generated by T2. That is to say that all 
people responding to conflict tasks in De Neys’s (2006b) 
study were responding using a T2 process, because all of 
them showed an effect of loading on WM while solving 
the conflict syllogisms.
The difference in results between conflict and no- 
conflict syllogisms fits perfectly well with a basic predic-
tion that would derive from E&S’s DPTs. Easy tasks do 
not load on WM and do not affect accuracy, thus they are 
performed using T1; whereas hard tasks load on WM and 
affect accuracy, thus they are performed using T2. 
However, the interpretation is based on a quantitative 
distinction on a single dimension, which is the difficulty 
of the task. Of course, the rather simplistic prediction that 
I have proposed for interpreting the actual data that De 
Neys finds is not quite what E&S’s DPTs and other DPTs, 
(e.g., Epstein, 1994; Evans, 2003; Evans & Over, 1996; 
Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000) would have in 
mind.
What doesn’t sit well with them is that WMC, which 
would typically be used by dual processing to demon-
strate individual difference in performance, should actu-
ally be shown to reveal fundamental qualitative differences 
between T1 and T2—not merely quantitative differences. 
In the case of conflict syllogisms, a DPT sympathizer 
would predict the following: Those with low WMC should 
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perform worse than those with high WMC—De Neys 
(2006b) did find this. Next, a DPT sympathizer would pre-
dict that those with low WMC should not show an effect 
of loading on WM because they are using automatic pro-
cesses to solve the task, where as those with high WMC 
should show an effect of loading on WM because they are 
using analytic processes that are typically slow and drain 
WMC. In effect, DPTs would predict an interaction 
between WMC and WM load, which De Neys (2006b) did 
not find. Therefore, De Neys’s (2006b) study doesn’t sup-
port a qualitative distinction between T1 and T2. Instead, 
the findings can be taken to show that the same reasoning 
process generates accurate responses to easier tasks and 
generates inaccurate responses to harder tasks.
Reinterpreting evidence of qualitative 
differences between T1 and T2 based 
on automaticity as quantitative 
differences
E&S’s DPTs are explicit about the fact that only differen-
tial loadings on WM and autonomous and hypothetical 
features definitively distinguish T1 processing from T2 
processing, and speed of processing is a sufficient but 
not necessary feature. Given the description of the rela-
tionship between T1 and T2 processing, T1 should typi-
cally generate responses faster than T2, especially since 
the collection of phenomena under T1 processing are 
autonomous, and processes that are automatic tend to be 
fast (Posner, 1978). We can explore the autonomous 
nature of T1 processing and its immunity from loading 
on WM in De Neys’s (2006a) findings, which E&S take as 
support for their reformulation of DPTs.
In De Neys’s (2006a) study, a variety of well-worn rea-
soning and judgment tasks were used (e.g., the “Linda 
problem” and the deontic and indicative versions of the 
selection task) in combination with a variety of methods 
of loading on WM. For reasons of complementarity with 
the previous case study, I will focus on the findings from 
the selection task because the WM loading manipulation 
was the same as De Neys (2006b) study. Though I should 
note that I have not carefully selected findings to suit my 
purposes, a reading of De Neys’s (2006a) study will show 
that I have accurately reported the headline results (also, 
see De Neys, 2012). The selection task involves a set of 
four cards that are presented along with a conditional 
statement such as “if there is a vowel on one side, then 
there is an even number on the other” (indicative—a 
context that refers to an arbitrary conditional rule) or “If 
a person is drinking beer, then the person needs to be 
over 21 years of age” (deontic—a context that refers to 
regulations). People are asked to select cards that would 
test the rule. One uncontroversial point that can be made 
is that the main reason for the boost in performance in 
deontic tasks (as compared with indicative tasks) is that 
prior knowledge about real world infractions of regula-
tions facilitates responses. Moreover, deontic tasks are 
hypothesized to be performed using T1 processing, 
which is automatic and fast by definition (Evans, 2003; 
Evans & Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 
2000).
De Neys (2006a) examined the effects of WM loading 
on accuracy of performance in deontic and indicative 
tasks. A simple DPT prediction would be that there 
should be no effect of WM load on accuracy in deontic 
tasks, but there should be an effect of WM load on accu-
racy in indicative versions. De Neys (2006a, Experiment 
2) showed that, in both Deontic and Indicative versions 
of the selection task, accuracy of performance was poorer 
when there was a load on WM than when there was no 
load—a finding also reported by Oaksford, Morris, 
Grainger, and Williams (1996). Thus, the prediction was 
not supported. Instead, the findings tell us that reason-
ing in deontic and indicative tasks requires WM. The 
more WM is loaded, the worse performance is in both 
versions. This means that either deontic tasks are not 
solved by T1 processes (which are automatic) or that T1 
processes are not automatic. More to the point, the find-
ings clearly contradict E&S’s DPTs and most other DP 
accounts.
How automatic is automatic in the 
case of T1 processing?
Surprisingly, there are few studies that have actually 
recorded participants’ response latencies while reasoning 
(De Neys, 2006a; Osman, 2007; Roberts & Newton, 2001) 
in order to examine speed of processing of T1 and T2. 
Other than its immunity from loading on WM, the discus-
sion now focuses on T1 processing as a fast process. As 
mentioned previously, T1 processing is commonly asso-
ciated with deontic tasks, so one question that can be 
posed is “How fast is reasoning on Deontic tasks?”. To 
answer this, we can return to De Neys (2006a). As well as 
manipulating load for deontic and indicative tasks, De 
Neys recorded latencies for time spent reading the 
instructions and time spent making inferences. For deon-
tic tasks, people took about 26 s to make an inference 
under load conditions (versus 20 s for indicative tasks) 
and they spent about 22 s making an inference without a 
load (versus 20 s for indicative tasks). When time spent 
making inferences was compared for both versions, 
regardless of load manipulation, there was no difference 
(De Neys, 2006a; Roberts & Newton, 2001). This result is 
problematic because deontic tasks are supposedly solved 
by T1 processing, and T1 is automatic, so responses 
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should at least be faster for deontic tasks than for indica-
tive tasks. Also, if T1 is immune from WM loading, then 
responses should be faster for deontic tasks. Neither of 
these claims was supported by the evidence.
Is it automatic if one takes 26 s to make an inference 
based on prior knowledge? Another problem that the evi-
dence raises is that there is no clear definition of what 
automatic T1 processing is. Stanovich (2004) proposed 
TASS (the autonomous set of systems), which refers to a 
set of processes that fall under what E&S’s DPTs call T1 
and respond automatically to triggering stimuli. If we stay 
in the domains of higher order cognition, then we can try 
to examine the speed of processes that are part of TASS 
by considering the Linda problem. This task is an exam-
ple in which erroneous responses are thought to be gen-
erated by T1. The reason for this is that the information 
presented in the task automatically triggers prior knowl-
edge used to help make a judgment about the likelihood 
of various statements corresponding to a fictional charac-
ter called Linda that conflict with the correct response. 
Fortunately De Neys (2006a) recorded judgment times. 
People spent about 47 s making the erroneous judgments 
and about 57 s making the correct judgments. Clearly 
making the right responses takes longer, but the impor-
tant question here is whether 47 s reflects an autono-
mous response: 47 s appears to be rather a long time 
(excluding time taken to read the instructions) and cer-
tainly more than the 19 s (on average) taken to make the 
correct response in the deontic version of the selection 
task (De Neys, 2006a, Experiment 1). This is a crude 
comparison, but hopefully it makes the point. Of the col-
lection of tasks that are automatic, the response times are 
not uniformly the same—they need not be. However, 
there does need to be an agreed point of comparison. 
The term automatic can only have resonance if it pre-
cisely specified relative to a specific benchmark. What 
this would require is a clear definition of the contribution 
of T1 processing and T2 processing in time spent reading 
instructions, interpreting instructions, encoding task 
information, evaluating the information, and making the 
response. More to the point it would also require specify-
ing where exactly in these various activities automaticity 
comes in to play. This, at least, is what goes on in other 
domains of cognition in which automaticity in processing 
is studied (e.g., Hommel, 2000).
Warnings From Other Domains, Some 
Reflections and Questions
My final direct comment on the characteristics defining 
T1 and T2 concerns the association between WMC and 
hypothetical thinking. It seems that one of the prototypi-
cal characteristics of higher cognition is representing 
abstract relations, simulating events, and reasoning about 
the consequences that have yet to happen. If we look to 
what causal reasoning involves, mental simulation is 
often required to play out various scenarios and to imag-
ine hypothetical consequences. Is this capacity associ-
ated with T1 or T2? Take our ability to follow complex 
story lines in soap operas (Hagmayer & Osman, in press). 
We are able to mentally simulate multiple complex events 
and infer what would happen next with a great deal of 
ease. In fact, soap operas work precisely because of this 
capability, otherwise we would not be able to follow 
story lines or even be engaged in what goes on. In these 
and other social contexts, evidence shows that causal 
knowledge is recruited to help mentally simulate the 
various outcomes of different hypothetical situations. 
Moreover, high level mental simulation can be achieved 
with very little processing cost. So, one question that this 
work raises is how the ability to simulate over multiple 
hypothetical scenarios is reconciled within E&S’s DPT, 
given that mental simulation is definitively T2 processing, 
and immunity from loading of WMC is definitively T1 
processing.
Finally, turning to decision making in the real world, 
one program of research born out of qualitative distinc-
tions between T1 and T2 has now moved on from 
making dichotomies (Osman, 2010a, 2010b). For instance, 
attempts to find qualitative dissociations between 
dynamic decision making based on WMC capacity and 
automaticity have not stood the test of time and have 
since been abandoned. The research agenda and research 
questions are focused on issues that have moved away 
from dissociations, because the complexity of the cogni-
tion that is being studied cannot be boxed in to such a 
narrow conception. Perhaps the same trend may apply to 
other higher cognitive functions (e.g., reasoning, judg-
ment, problem solving). It is very likely that future 
research will show that these higher cognitive functions 
are each multifaceted and are built on other multifaceted 
processes. If so, is it appropriate to carve up higher cog-
nitive functions into such a simple framework (DPTs)? 
Especially when the distinctions between T1 and T2 are 
based on what are actually quantitative rather than quali-
tative differences?
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